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Geologists,	   chemists,	   biologists,	   and	  many	  physicists	   tend	   to	  be	   impatient	  
when	   they	   hear	   about	   the	   problem	   of	   underdetermination	   of	   theory	   by	  
evidence.	   A	   common	   response	   is	   to	   declare	   that	   this	   is	   simply	   a	  
philosopher's	  problem	  (in	  the	  pejorative	  sense),	  a	  conundrum	  that	  people	  
with	   a	   certain	   quirky	   intelligence	   might	   play	   with,	   but	   something	   of	   no	  
relevance	   to	   the	   sciences.	   That	   response	   is	   overblown.	   …	   Yet	   the	   sound	  
instinct	   expressed	   in	   quick	   dismissal	   is	   a	   legitimate	   wish	   to	   be	   shown	  
convincing	  examples	  across	  the	  range	  of	  scientific	  disciplines.	  Philip	  Kitcher	  	  
Science,	  Truth,	  and	  Democracy	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   fact	   that	   solving	   the	   inverse	   problem	   yields	   a	   set	   of	   model	  
parameters	  that	  describe	  the	  observations	  well	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  
that	   the	   resulting	   model	   actually	   reflects	   physical	   reality.	   …	   In	   fact,	   we	  
often	  have	  no	  way	  of	  determining	  what	  the	  reality	  is.	  For	  example,	  we	  will	  
never	   truly	   know	   the	   composition	   and	   temperature	   of	   the	   earth’s	   core	  
because	   we	   cannot	   go	   there.	   This	   limitation	   remains	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	  
that	  over	  time	  our	  models	  of	  the	  core	  have	  become	  increasingly	  consistent	  
with	   seismological	   data,	   experimental	   results	   about	   materials	   at	   high	  
pressure	   and	   temperature,	   and	   other	   data	   including	   inferences	   from	  
meteorites	  about	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  solar	  system.	  Seth	  Stein	  and	  Michael	  Wysession	  	  
An	  Introduction	  to	  Seismology,	  Earthquakes,	  and	  Earth	  Structure	  	   1. INTRODUCTION	  Underdetermination	   arguments	   against	   scientific	   realism	   have	   a	   familiar	  structure.	   First	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   underdetermination	   of	   theory	   by	   evidence	   is	  endemic:	  for	  any	  scientific	  theory,	  it	  would	  be	  unsurprising	  were	  there	  to	  exist	  a	  theory	  empirically	  equivalent	  to	  it	  (i.e.,	  a	  theory	  that	  makes	  identical	  predictions	  about	   all	   observable	   matters	   of	   fact).	   Then	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   such	  underdetermination	   undermines	   scientific	   realism:	   from	   the	   (not	   unlikely)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  †	  Thanks	  to	  Kevin	  Coffey	  and	  Teru	  Miyake	  for	  helpful	  comments	  on	  an	  earlier	  version.	  ‡	  Forthcoming	  in	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research.	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existence	  of	  empirically	  equivalent	  alternatives	  to	  extant	  theories,	  it	  follows	  that	  we	   should	  have	   little	   confidence	   in	   even	   the	   approximate	   truth	   of	   our	   current	  theories,	   no	   matter	   how	   well	   they	   fit	   all	   available	   evidence.	   Of	   course,	   such	  arguments	  rest	  on	  the	  presupposition	  that	  there	  is	  some	  fixed	  salient	  distinction	  between	  the	  observable	  and	  the	  unobservable.1	  My	  interest	  here	  is	  in	  the	  first	  step.	  Realists	  tend	  to	  see	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  in	  this	  matter	  as	   lying	  with	  anti-­‐realists.2	  It	   is	  not	  enough	   to	  point	   to	  examples	  of	  pairs	   of	   physical	   theories	   that	   are	   empirically	   equivalent	   relative	   to	   some	  criterion	  of	   observability	   (Ptolemy	   and	  Copernicus,	   suitably	   restricted);	   nor	   to	  give	   general	   recipes	   for	   producing	   a	   theory	   empirically	   equivalent	   to	   a	   given	  theory	   that	   invoke	   concepts	   with	   dubious	   scientific	   credentials	   (“just	   allow	  miniature	  blue	  gnomes	  to	  do	  whatever	  work	  electrons	  are	  supposed	  to	  do”);	  nor	  to	  offer	  a	  general	  recipe	   that	   takes	  as	   input	  not	  genuine	  scientific	   theories,	  but	  rather	   formal	   surrogates	   for	   such	   theories.3	  What	   is	   wanted	   is	   a	  more	   or	   less	  general	  recipe	  for	  reliably	  generating	  an	  empirically	  equivalent	  alternative	  to	  a	  given	  theory—a	  recipe	   that	   takes	  as	   input	  and	  gives	  as	  output	   things	   that	   look	  like	  actual	  scientific	  theories.	  Absent	  that,	  it	  is	  widely	  felt,	  realists	  are	  entitled	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  theories	  empirically	  equivalent	  to	  our	  best	  theories	  is	  an	  idle	  philosophical	  fantasy.	  	  I	  do	  not	  have	  such	  a	  recipe	  to	  offer.	  But	  I	  think	  that	  reflection	  on	  some	  down	  to	  earth	  considerations	  shows	  that	  realists	  are	  mistaken	  about	  where	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  lies.	  	  	   2.	  UNDERDETERMINATION	  IN	  GEOPHYSICs	  We	   can	   investigate	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	   the	   Earth	   by	   making	  measurements	  at	  its	  surface.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  an	  influential	  attack	  on	  all	  three	  aspects	  of	  underdetermination	  arguments,	  see	  Laudan	  and	  Leplin	  (1991).	  2	  For	  discussion	  and	  references,	  see	  Stanford	  (2013,	  §3.2).	  3	  See	  Earman	  (1993)	  for	  a	  sophisticated	  and	  illuminating	  implementation	  of	  this	  last	  strategy.	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GRAVIMETRY.	  The	  problem	  of	  gravimetry	  is	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  distribution	  of	  mass	  density	  within	  the	  Earth	  from	  knowledge	  of	   the	  gravitational	   field	  at	  points	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  Earth.	  TRAVEL-­‐TIME	  TOMOGRAPHY.	  Earthquakes,	  volcanic	  eruptions,	  nuclear	  detonations,	  etc.,	   send	   compression	   waves	   through	   the	   interior	   of	   the	   Earth.	   Like	   light	  rays	   travelling	   through	  a	  medium	  of	  variable	   refractive	   index,	   these	   can	  be	  thought	   of	   as	   travelling	   along	   lines	   whose	   departure	   from	   straightness	   is	  caused	   by	   variations	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   material	   through	   which	   they	  propagate.4	  The	   problem	   of	   travel-­‐time	   tomography	   (also	   known	   as	   the	  
kinematic	   inverse	   problem)	   is	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   way	   that	   the	   index	   of	  refraction	  (speed	  of	  waves)	  varies	  within	  the	  Earth	  from	  knowledge	  of	  how	  long	   it	   takes	  news	  of	   a	   seismic	  disturbance	  at	   certain	  points	  on	   the	  Earth’s	  surface	  to	  reach	  certain	  other	  points	  on	  the	  Earth’s	  surface.5	  	  NEUTRINO	   TOMOGRAPHY.	   To	   an	   excellent	   first	   approximation,	   neutrinos	   travel	  through	   the	  Earth	   along	   straight	   lines,	  with	   the	   chance	   of	   a	   given	  neutrino	  being	   absorbed	   being	   proportional	   to	   the	   nucleon	   density	   in	   the	   matter	  through	   which	   it	   passes.	   The	   problem	   of	   neutrino	   tomography	   is	   to	  reconstruct	  the	  pattern	  of	  nucleon	  density	  within	  the	  Earth	  from	  knowledge	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  attenuation	  of	  beams	  of	  neutrinos	  passing	  between	  given	  pairs	  of	  points	  at	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  Earth.6	  For	   problems	   of	   these	   sorts,	   the	   family	   of	   possible	   internal	   structures	   of	   the	  Earth	  under	  consideration	  will	  be	  vast:	  completely	  specifying	  the	  internal	  state	  of	   the	   planet	  would	   involve	   specifying	   the	   values	   of	   infinitely	  many	   quantities	  (e.g.,	  one	  might	  specify	  the	  density	  at	  each	  of	  an	  infinite	  set	  of	  points	  internal	  to	  the	  planet).	  Performing	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  measurements	  external	  to	  the	  planet	  will	  allow	  one	  to	  determine	  the	  values	  of	  only	  finitely	  many	  such	  quantities.	  So	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Here	  we	  pretend,	  somewhat	  unrealistically,	  that	  the	  Earth	  is	  an	  isotropic	  elastic	  solid	  and	  focus	  only	  on	  one	  of	  the	  many	  types	  of	  waves	  generated	  by	  seismic	  events.	  5	  See	  Uhlmann	  (2001)	  for	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  mathematics	  of	  travel-­‐time	  tomography.	  6	  This	  problem	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  x-­‐ray	  tomography	  and	  other	  problems	  of	  medical	  imaging—for	  a	  survey,	  see	  Deans	  (2007,	  Chapter	  1).	  The	  idea	  of	  neutrino	  tomography,	  which	  has	  not	   yet	   been	   put	   into	   practice,	   seems	   to	   have	   originated	   in	   a	   science	   fiction	   novel,	   Clement	  (1971).	  For	  a	  recent	  discussion	  of	  this	  technique,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Winter	  (2006).	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the	  family	  of	  models	  consistent	  with	  any	  finite	  set	  of	  measurements	  will	  still	  be	  vast	   (infinite-­‐dimensional).	   It	   is	   standard	   to	   appeal	   to	   considerations	   of	  simplicity	  and	  general	  plausibility	  in	  cutting	  down	  this	  underdetermination.7	  	  	  	  Short-­‐term	   underdetermination	   of	   theory	   by	   data	   is	   only	   to	   be	   expected—few	   interesting	   scientific	   questions	   can	   be	   settled	   absolutely	   definitively	   by	  looking	   at	   a	   finite	   amount	   of	   data.8	  What	   about	   underdetermination	   in	   the	  infinite	   long-­‐run	   in	  which	   complete	   data	   sets	   become	   available?	   Here	  we	   find	  interesting	   differences	   between	   methods	   of	   investigating	   the	   Earth’s	   internal	  structure.	  For	  neutrino	  tomography,	  underdetermination	  evaporates	  in	  the	  limit	  of	  complete	  data:	  if	  the	  rate	  of	  attenuation	  for	  neutrino	  beams	  between	  each	  pair	  of	  points	  at	  the	  Earth’s	  surface	  is	  fixed,	  then	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  the	  internal	  structure	   of	   the	   Earth	   are	   fixed.9	  The	   situation	   is	   quite	   different	   in	   the	   case	   of	  gravimetry:	   corresponding	   to	   any	   given	   configuration	  of	   the	   gravitational	   field	  external	   to	   the	  Earth	   is	  a	  vast	  (infinite-­‐dimensional)	   family	  of	  possible	   internal	  structures	   (some	   of	   which	   will	   differ	   very	   dramatically	   from	   one	   another).10	  Travel-­‐time	   tomography	  constitutes	  an	   interesting	   intermediate	  case:	   for	  some	  internal	  structures	  the	  Earth	  might	  have,	  underdetermination	  would	  evaporate	  in	  the	  limit	  of	  complete	  data;	  for	  others,	  even	  complete	  data	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  a	  vast	  and	  various	  family	  of	  possibilities.11	  	  Of	  course,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Earth	  and	  other	  planets,	  we	  have	  ways	  of	  finding	  out	  about	  internal	  structure	  other	  than	  by	  making	  measurements	  at	  the	  surface	  (in	  principle,	  if	  not	  in	  practice).	  But	  the	  techniques	  considered	  above	  can	  be	  used	  to	   study	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	   the	   Sun	   and	  other	   stars	   (in	   principle	   and,	   in	  some	   cases,	   in	   practice—see,	   e.g.,	   Nolet	   2008).	   And	   in	   the	   stellar	   case	   there	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  discussions	   of	   several	   popular	   approaches,	   see	  Parker	   (1994)	   and	  Tarantola	   (2005).	   See	  also	   the	  philosophical	   literature	  on	   this	   topic:	  Miyake	   (2013).	  Note	   that	   very	   similar	  problems	  arise	  in	  medical	  imaging;	  see,	  e.g.,	  Smith	  et	  al.	  (1977)	  and	  Helgason	  (2011,	  §I.7.B).	  8	  For	  a	  dramatic	  illustration	  of	  this	  point,	  see	  Theorem	  4.2	  in	  Smith	  et	  al.	  (1977).	  9	  See,	  e.g.,	  Smith	  et	  al.	  (1977,	  §4)	  or	  Helgason	  (2011,	  Chapter	  I).	  10	  For	  helpful	  discussions,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Anger	  (1990,	  §§3.2,	  4.2,	  and	  5.3),	  Michel	  and	  Fokas	  (2008),	  or	  Sansò	  and	  Tscherning	  (1989).	  11	  For	  relevant	  results,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Croke	  (1991)	  and	  Pestov	  and	  Uhlmann	  (2005).	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considerable	  plausibility	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  we	  never	  will	   (and	  never	  could)	  have	  any	  way	  of	  investigating	  internal	  structure	  directly.	  	  	  So	   there	   is	  a	   sense	   in	  which	  underdetermination	  of	   scientific	   theory	  by	   (all	  possible)	  evidence	  is	  not	  only	  possible	  but	  actual.	  I	  suspect	  that	  most	  realists	  will	  be	  unfazed	  by	   this	  observation.	  For	  consider	  a	  widely-­‐discussed	  case	   that	   is	   in	  some	  ways	  analogous	  to	  our	  examples.	  In	  general	  relativity,	  even	  infinitely	  long-­‐lived	  observers	  cannot	  in	  general	  determine	  the	  topology	  of	  the	  cosmos	  in	  which	  they	   live.12	  Many	   realists	   accept	   that	   this	   is	   a	   case	   of	   underdetermination	   that	  points	  up	  a	   limit	   to	  the	  reach	  of	  scientific	  reason.13	  But	   few	  see	  here	  much	  of	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  project	  of	  scientific	  realism.14	  It	  is,	  for	  instance,	  sometimes	  asserted	  that	   the	   real	   battlefield	   in	   the	   debate	   over	   scientific	   realism	   is	   the	   status	   of	  theories—rather	  than	  that	  of	  particular	  facts,	  such	  as	  the	  topology	  of	  our	  cosmos	  (or,	  presumably,	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  Earth	  or	  the	  Sun).15	  	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  there	  is	  a	  stable	  form	  of	  scientific	  realism	  that	  concedes	  so	  easily	  that	  science	  is	  incapable	  of	  resolving	  some	  questions	  that	  are	  ordinarily	  regarded	  as	  scientific.	  	  (a)	   I	   suspect	   that	   many	   realists	   will	   agree	   that	   Fine	   puts	   his	   finger	   on	   an	  important	   sense	   in	   which,	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   scientific	   practice,	  constructive	  empiricism	  and	  other	  anti-­‐realisms	  ask	  us	  to	  make	  an	  epistemically	  invidious	  distinction:	  [Constructive	   empiricism]	   can	   follow	   the	   usual	   lattice	   of	   inferences	   and	   reasons	   that	  issues	   in	   scientific	   beliefs	   only	   until	   it	   reaches	   the	   border	   of	   the	   observable,	   at	  which	  point	  the	  shift	  is	  made	  from	  belief	  to	  acceptance.	  But	  the	  inferential	  network	  that	  winds	  back	  and	  forth	  across	  this	  border	  is	  in	  no	  way	  different	  from	  that	  on	  the	  observable	  side	  alone.	  (1986,	  167)	  	  	  But	   if	   that	   is	   what	   bothers	   realists	   about	   constructive	   empiricism,	   then	   they	  should	  also	  be	  bothered	  by	  the	  suggestion	  that	  belief	  should	  be	  withheld	  in	  cases	  of	   infinite	   long-­‐run	  underdetermination.	  After	  all,	   in	  the	  short	  run	  the	  lattice	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  Glymour	  (1977),	  Malament	  (1977),	  and	  Manchak	  (2009).	  For	  the	  role	  of	  this	  problem	  in	  the	  genesis	  of	  constructive	  empiricism,	  see	  van	  Fraassen	  (1985,	  Postscript	  §1).	  13	  See,	   e.g.,	   Earman	   (1993,	   §9),	   Glymour	   (1980	   354	   ff.),	   and	   Stanford	   (2006,	   13	   f.).	   For	   a	  dissenting	  voice,	  see	  Norton	  (2011).	  14	  Earman	  (1993)	  is	  perhaps	  an	  exception.	  15	  For	  this	  viewpoint,	  see	  Stanford	  (2006,	  13	  f.)	  and	  Norton	  (2011,	  §3).	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inferences	  concerning,	  e.g.,	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  Earth	  will	  look	  much	  the	  same	  whether	  we	  are	  working	  with	  a	   technique	   for	  which	  underdetermination	  vanishes	  in	  the	  infinite	  long	  run	  (such	  as	  determination	  of	  the	  internal	  magnetic	  field	  from	  the	  external	  magnetic	  field)	  or	  one	  such	  for	  which	  it	  does	  not	  (such	  as	  gravimetry).16	  	  (b)	   Consider	   the	   proposal	   floated	   by	   Earman	   (1993,	   §11):	   Bayesian	   agents	  should	  distance	  themselves	  from	  their	  judgements	  of	  the	  relative	  plausibility	  of	  pairs	   of	   hypotheses	   just	   in	   case	   convergence	   of	   their	   own	   opinion	   to	   the	   true	  hypothesis	   cannot	   be	   expected	   even	   in	   the	   infinite	   long-­‐run.	   Following	   this	  advice	  can	   lead	  to	  disaster—e.g.,	   I	  may	  end	  up	  being	  thoroughly	  confident	   that	  the	   relation	  between	   the	  variables	   that	   I	  am	   investigating	   is	  given	  by	  a	  certain	  function,	   but	   be	   unwilling	   to	   pronounce	   on	  whether	   that	   function	   is	   or	   is	   not	  continuous	  (see	  Belot	  2013).	  	   3.	  UNDERDETERMINATION	  AND	  INVERSE	  PROBLEMS	  I	  contend	  that,	  seen	  in	  the	  proper	  light,	  examples	  like	  those	  from	  geophysics	  discussed	   above	   serve	   to	   undermine	   in	   a	   quite	   radical	   way	   the	   orthodox	  perception	   of	   the	   dialectic	   between	   realists	   and	   anti-­‐realists	   regarding	   the	  question	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  empirically	  equivalent	  rivals	  to	  scientific	  theories.	  	  The	  geophysical	  problems	  discussed	  above	  are	  examples	  of	  a	  type	  of	  problem	  that	   is	   endemic	   in	   the	   mathematical	   sciences.	   One	   has	   a	   space,	   X,	   of	   possible	  states	  of	  some	  system.	  There	   is	  some	  interesting	  class	  of	  observations	  that	  can	  be	  made	   on	   this	   system.	   There	   is	   some	   space,	   Y,	   whose	   points	   correspond	   to	  possible	   (joint)	   outcomes	   of	   this	   family	   of	   observations.	   Some	   background	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  On	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   magnetic	   field	   reconstruction,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Gubbins	   (2007).	   Authors	   of	  textbooks	   on	   geophysics	   will	   often	   note	   that	   there	   is	   an	   in-­‐principle	   problem	   of	  underdetermination	   in	  gravimetry	   that	   is	  absent	   in	  some	  other	  problems.	  But	   this	  observation	  has	  no	  apparent	   impact	  on	   the	  advice	  offered	   to	  practitioners	   facing	  problems	  of	  either	  sort—see,	  e.g.,	  Parker	  (1994,	  241).	  Indeed,	  some	  authors	  are	  explicit	  about	  the	  practical	  irrelevance	  of	  infinite	   long-­‐run	   considerations:	   e.g.,	   Scales	   and	   Snieder	   remark	   that	   while	   the	   problem	   of	  infinite	   long-­‐run	   uniqueness	   is	   “hotly	   debated	   in	   the	   mathematical	   literature	   on	   inverse	  problems,	   it	   is	   largely	   irrelevant	   for	   practical	   inverse	   problems”	   (2000,	   1708).	   For	   what	   it	   is	  worth:	  so	  far	  as	  I	  can	  tell,	   the	  authors	  of	  the	  second	  epigraph	  above	  do	  not	  take	  the	  distinction	  between	   those	  problems	   in	  which	  underdetermination	   evaporates	   in	   the	   infinite	   long	   run	   and	  others	  to	  be	  epistemologically	  salient.	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theory	   tells	   one,	   for	   each	   possible	   state	   x	   in	  X,	  what	   evidence	   y	   in	  Y	  would	   be	  gathered	   were	   the	   system	   in	   that	   state	   and	   one	   were	   to	   perform	   each	   of	   the	  possible	  observations	  on	  that	  system.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   the	  work	  done	  by	  this	  theory	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  in	  a	  function	  K	  that	  maps	  states	  in	  X	  to	  evidence	  sets	  in	  Y	  that	  takes	  as	  input	  a	  possible	  state	  of	  the	  system	  and	  gives	  as	  output	  the	  corresponding	   body	   of	   outcomes	   of	   observations.	   This	   is	   a	   so-­‐called	   direct	  
problem.	   Corresponding	   to	   each	   direct	   problem	   is	   an	   inverse	   problem:	   given	   a	  body	  of	  evidence	  y	   in	  Y,	   find	   those	   states	  x	   in	  X	   such	   that	  y	  =	  K(x).	  Each	  of	   the	  geophysical	  problems	  considered	  above	  is	  an	  inverse	  problem	  of	  this	  kind.	  	  The	  question	  whether	  or	  not,	  for	  each	  body	  of	  observation	  outcomes,	  there	  is	  a	  unique	  compatible	  state	  of	  the	  system	  is	  the	  question	  whether	  K	  is	  or	  is	  not	  an	  invertible	   function.	   In	   our	   geophysical	   examples,	   if	   our	   focus	   is	   on	   a	   finite	  number	  of	  observations	  performed	  at	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  Earth,	  then	  the	  relevant	  map	  K	  is	  never	  invertible:	  for	  any	  y	  there	  is	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  compatible	  x.	  If	  we	  focus	   instead	   on	   the	   class	   of	   all	   possible	   observations	   of	   a	   given	   type	  performable	   at	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   Earth,	   we	   find	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	   neutrino	  tomography	  the	  relevant	  map	  K	  is	  invertible—but	  that	  the	  maps	  corresponding	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  gravimetry	  and	  travel-­‐time	  tomography	  are	  not.	  	  These	   examples	   from	   geophysics	   are	   not	   atypical.	   Very	   often,	   one	   is	  interested	   in	   systems	  with	   infinitely	  many	   degrees	   of	   freedom.	   In	   that	   case,	   a	  finite	   number	   of	   observations	   will	   never	   suffice	   to	   determine	   the	   state	   of	   the	  system.	   If	   one	   considers	   an	   infinite	   number	   of	   possible	   observations,	   the	  underdetermination	  may	  or	  may	  not	  disappear—this	  depends	  on	  the	  details	  of	  the	  theory	  determining	  the	  connection	  between	  states	  and	  data	  and	  on	  the	  space	  of	  states	  in	  question.17	  	  	  Consider	  now	  the	  mother	  of	  all	  inverse	  problems.	  The	  space	  X is	  the	  space	  of	  all	  possible	  total	  theories	  (laws	  and	  initial	  conditions).	  The	  space	  Y	  is	  the	  space	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  One	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  reason	  that,	  at	  least	  under	  ideal	  circumstances,	  invertible	  K	  ought	  to	  be	   typical.	  After	  all:	   if	  X	   and	  Y	   are	  vector	  spaces	  of	   the	  same	   finite	  dimension	  and	  K	   is	  a	   linear	  map,	   then,	   generically,	  K	   is	   invertible	   (the	   set	  of	   invertible	  n	   by	  n	  matrices	   forms	  an	  open	  and	  dense	  subset	  of	  the	  space	  of	  n	  by	  n	  matrices).	  But	  this	  result	  does	  not	  carry	  over	  to	  the	  infinite-­‐dimensional	  setting,	  even	  in	  the	  linear	  case.	  See	  Bouldin	  (1990).	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of	   all	   possible	   (joint)	   observation	   outcomes.	   The	  map	  K associates	  with	   each	  theory	  x	  in	  X	  the	  body	  of	  evidence	  y	  in	  Y	  that	  would	  be	  available	  were	  x	  true.	  	  Clearly	   there	  are	  difficulties	   in	  making	   this	  picture	  precise.	  The	  notion	  of	   a	  space	   of	   all	   possible	   theories	   is	   of	   dubious	   coherence—e.g.,	   on	   cardinality	  grounds.18	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  space	  of	  all	  possible	  observations	  is	  if	  anything	  even	  more	   fraught.	   And	   the	  map	  K	   is	   also	   beset	   by	   difficult	   questions:	   in	   order	   to	  make	  sense	  of	  it,	  one	  would	  presumably	  have	  to	  think	  of	  the	  background	  theory	  that	   underwrites	   the	   passage	   from	   a	   theory	   of	   everything	   (including	   initial	  conditions	  as	  well	  as	  laws)	  to	  an	  account	  of	  what	  would	  we	  would	  observe	  were	  that	   theory	   true	   as	   including	   logic	   together	   with	   some	   account,	   of	   the	   sort	  sketched	   in	   van	   Fraassen	   (1980),	   of	   how	   theories	   internally	   demarcate	   the	  boundary	  between	  the	  observable	  and	  the	  unobservable.	  	  Still,	  the	  picture	  makes	  rough	  heuristic	  sense.	  And	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  picture,	  the	  question	  in	  dispute	  between	  the	  realist	  and	  the	  anti-­‐realist	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  K	  is	  invertible—or,	  perhaps	  more	  plausibly,	  whether	  for	  a	  typical	  or	  generic	  body	  of	  evidence	  y	  there	  is	  a	  unique	  theory	  x	  such	  that	  y=K(x).	  	  	  It	   is	   usually	   held	   that	   there	   is	   a	   presumption	   in	   favour	   of	   an	   affirmative	  answer	   here.	   Perhaps	   that	   seems	   plausible	  when	   anti-­‐realists,	   after	  muttering	  for	   a	   while	   about	   one	   or	   two	   suggestive	   examples,	   assert	   without	   further	  argument	   that	   there	   are	   likely	   theories	   empirically	   equivalent	   to	   our	   favourite	  theories.	  	  But	   the	   dialectic	   takes	   on	   a	   quite	   different	   cast	   when	   one	   thinks	   of	   anti-­‐realists	  as	  advancing	  a	  claim	  about	  a	  very	  complicated	  inverse	  problem.	  There	  is	  not	  yet	  any	  general	   theory	  of	   inverse	  problems.	  One	  cannot	  definitively	  assert:	  most	  inverse	  problems	  do	  (or	  do	  not)	  involve	  underdetermination	  of	  theory	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Prima	  facie,	  for	  each	  cardinal	  number,	  there	  is	  a	  theory	  whose	  space	  of	  states	  is	  a	  Hilbert	  space	  with	   dimension	   of	   that	   cardinality.	   So	   the	   possible	   theories	   form	   a	   proper	   class	   rather	   than	   a	  set—which	  means	   that	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   speak	  of	   the	  space	  of	  all	   theories	  as	  having	  a	   structure.	  Note	  that	  while	  renormalization	  group	  methods	  in	  quantum	  field	  theory	  are	  sometimes	  said	  to	  be	  set	   in	  a	   “space	  of	  all	   theories,”	  something	  quite	  restricted	   is	   in	   fact	  meant.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Costello	  (2011,	  Chapter	  1).	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observation.19	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  perusal	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  inverse	  problems	  that	  arise	   in	  contemporary	  physical	   science	  suggests	   that	   it	  would	  be,	   to	  put	   it	  mildly,	  highly	   incautious	   to	  suppose	   that	   the	  map	  determined	  by	  a	  complicated	  and	   ill-­‐understood	  direct	   problem	  was	   invertible	   and	  hence	   that	   there	  was	  no	  underdetermination	   in	   the	   associated	   inverse	   problem.	   But	   that	   is	   just	   what	  realists	  are	  supposing	  in	  asserting	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  lies	  with	  anti-­‐realists	  in	  their	  dispute	  over	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  underdetermination	  argument	  against	  scientific	  realism.	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